

Ex Reg
JSC

7 DEC 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Issues to be discussed with Administrator of GSA

1. In accordance with your request, attached are bullets covering the four issues you raised in your letter to Mr. Carmen on 29 November 1983. These issues include the following:

a. Protective Service for CIA facilities (Attachment A).

b. [redacted] GSA reneging on prior agreement to waive SLUC (Attachment B).

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(Note: If we must pay the reduced SLUC, it is not budgeted in FY 84 since we assumed at the time of budget preparation that SLUC had been waived on this building.)

c. Headquarters Powerhouse (Attachment C).

d. Headquarters Building Maintenance and Operation (including planned New Building) (Attachment D).

2. Your letter to Mr. Carmen is contained in Attachment E.

3. OGC papers on CIA assuming support responsibilities of Agency facilities are contained in Attachment F.

Harry E. Fitzwater

Attachments

DDA:HEFitzwater:cn (7 Dec 83)
Distribution:

Orig - DCI w/atts (by hand)
1 - ER w/atts
1 - D/OL w/atts B, C, and D
1 - D/OS w/att A
1 - DDA Subj w/atts
1 - DDA Chrono
1 - HEF Chrono



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SECURITY GUARDS

PROBLEM

- . Federal Protective Officer (FPO) performance has been well below an acceptable level for an extended period.
- . International terrorism demands an effective guard force to protect Agency facilities and personnel.

FACTS

- . Federal Protective Service (FPS) leaders are disillusioned about their ability to improve service.
- . Based on historical record, inefficient GSA staffing methods are not likely to improve.
 - Forty percent vacancy rate over past several years. (Current vacancy 100 of 255 positions)
 - Operating with 60% of the guard force requires working double shifts and several have been found sleeping on post.
 - Excessive overtime (many guards working 16 hours per day).
- . CIA staff employees are the only alternative to FPS; Blue Blazer concept has already been started to supplement inadequate FPO force.
- . CIA staffing must be realistic, GSA FPO positions must be transferred to CIA in three phases:
 - Phase I - First Year: Takeover of all easily assumed posts of least difficulty.
 - Phase II - Second Year: Takeover of most internal posts, including outlying buildings.
 - Phase III - Third Year: Assumption of law enforcement responsibilities, weapons responsibilities, arrest authority, and traffic ticket functions.

RECOMMENDATION

- . CIA needs to regain control of guard force responsibilities.

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PROBLEM

- ° GSA Support of this activity, critical to the U.S. Government [redacted] was woefully inadequate.
- ° GSA agreed that CIA should take over the operations and maintenance and that no SLUC would be charged CIA.
- ° GSA now says CIA must pay a portion of the SLUC charge.

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FACTS


- ° There had been long history of dissatisfaction recorded over GSA support [redacted]
- ° There had been an equally long record of unsuccessful efforts made by the Agency to get GSA to improve the level of support, or to get out from under GSA.
- ° New initiatives beginning in 1980 culminated in agreement for the Agency to contract out for maintenance and operations in 1981.
 - Agreement with GSA understood by Agency to mean no more SLUC. (Fact sheet signed by Walter Kallaur, GSA Regional Administrator, 5 January 1981.)
 - Contract (maintenance, operation) negotiated with Allied. October 1982 and utilities for a total of [redacted]
- ° [redacted] FY 1983 SLUC bill is \$3,449,507.
- ° GSA has now taken the position that SLUC would be reduced, not waived:

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. DCI letter to Administrator, GSA - 8 Sep 83, requested:

- Transfer jurisdiction of building to CIA,
Title 40 U.S.C. 122.
- Waive SLUC, Title 40 U.S.C. 490 (j).

RECOMMENDATION

- Get agreement to transfer building jurisdiction to
CIA or waive SLUC.

MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF THE
HEADQUARTERS POWER PLANT

(Including Main Utility Distribution Centers
in the Headquarters Building)

PROBLEM

- . GSA has failed to adequately staff, maintain, and make necessary capital improvements.
- . Reliability of plant is critical to Agency's worldwide mission.
- . Dependence on computers and communications dictates need for reliable heating, cooling, and electric power. (i.e, SAFE, CAMS, TADS, etc)

FACTS

- . Power Plant must meet Agency's reliability needs.
- . GSA operation of the power plant has been unsatisfactory.
 - Inadequate staffing; GSA unable to recruit necessary personnel.
 - Lack of preventive maintenance.
 - Inadequate GSA provision for capital improvements.
 - Agency has had to provide funds for additional reimbursable personnel.
 - Agency has had to budget for majority of capital improvements.
- . Changes suggested by consultant study.
 - Adequate staffing; upgrade skills with matching salaries.
 - Install computerized monitoring and control system.
 - Institute equipment recapitalization program.
 - Institute preventive maintenance contracts with equipment manufacturers.

RECOMMENDATION

- . CIA operates the Power Plant, including main utility distribution centers in the Headquarters Building, by contracting out and incorporating changes recommended by consultant.

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MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF THE
HEADQUARTERS BUILDING

PROBLEM

- . The state of repair of the building and parking lots is deplorable.
- . The building needs to be painted, not only on hallways, but in rooms as well.
- . Minor work orders under \$1,500 take an average of eight to nine weeks to accomplish.
- . Major work orders over \$1,500 take an average of eight to nine weeks to accomplish.
- . The work force is inefficient and suffering from a lack of management.

FACTS

- . Of the [] the Agency pays to the General Services Administration, only [] is turned over to the Buildings Manager. It is inadequate.
- . The level of service to the building and its occupants is inadequate.
- . The building is going on 25 years old and such major items as the elevators and air conditioning failing must be anticipated.
- . GSA first line supervision of its personnel is ineffective and in some cases, nonexistent.
- . In view of money and personnel shortages, it is virtually impossible for the Buildings Manager to accomplish that level of maintenance and operation that the Agency expects and demands.
- . Building Manager, GS-13, has many other U.S. Government buildings to manage.

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RECOMMENDATION

- . The Agency contract out to maintain and operate the building utilizing a major portion of SLUC to pay for maintenance and operation.